Hot Work Is Defined As Welding

Hot work is defined as welding, cutting, grinding, or other spark-producing activities that can ignite flammable substances. To date in 2010, the CSB has learned of 15 serious hot work-related fires and explosions that caused six reported fatalities and numerous injuries. Industrial safety system BP was given four years to correct the safety issues identified pursuant to the settlement agreement, yet OSHA has found hundreds of violations of the agreement and hundreds of new violations. BP still has a great deal of work to do to assure the safety and health of the employees who work at this refinery, said acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA Jordan Barab. rae systems gas monitors Our conclusion is simple. If the area classification has been done, with certain assumptions or conditions, then the shopfloor workers must be knowing about it. If these conditions are changed, then the original area classification done becomes NULL and VOID. If this is not understood by all and sundry, then disasters may occur. Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency As you must have known by now, area classification is very important to industries and facilities that handle, store or otherwise process hazardous (flammable liquids and vapors). Also, if a facility is handling large amounts of dusts (like grain dust or coal dust), then it needs to be classified also as a hazardous area, with the code that is applicable to dusts. This classification can be sometimes very intimidating and even confusing, what with the plethora of varying standards and codes. The IEC system and the North American (NEC) systems are covered for vapors, gases, as well as dusts. Actual real life area classification drawings are provided, that really area a help, as compared to the same stale figures that are repeated in all publications. industrial scientific The level control loop, (that is supposed to control the level in the tank and prevent overfilling) on one of the storage tanks failed. It consisted of a Servo tank gauge connected to a series of valves. This failure led to overfilling and spillage of massive amounts of petroleum into the dikes surrounding the storage tank. Petroleum was being pumped in at a rate of about 550 m3/hr for more than three hours, yet the servo level gauge indication, failed to record any change at all! 

"The incident once again highlights the safety precautions that need to be taken when dealing with Hydrogen Sulfide gas. The Environmental Technology Council did not respond adequately to our 2007 recommendation, which we issued following an explosion and massive fire at the Environmental Quality hazardous waste facility in Apex, North Carolina, to work for more stringent standards in the hazardous waste industry. I strongly urge the industry to act now. These facilities, by their nature, contain wide varieties of flammable and toxic materials that can cause significant injury to workers and threaten the well being of nearby communities. Facility owners and operators need stricter technical requirements to improve the safety of life and property. Industrial Safety (European Technology Platform) The oil spill apparently occurred due to a rupture in a flexible export pipeline running from an FPSO in the Bonga field to an oil tanker. (FPSO is an acronym used in the Oil Gas industry for Floating Production Storage and Offtake vessels). rki instruments multi gas monitorsOccupational safety and health In addition to issuing recommendations to NFPA and the hazardous waste industry, the Board also issued recommendations to Veolia, which is rebuilding the plant. The CSB called on the company to restrict occupancy in buildings in close proximity to the operating plant to personnel trained in the safe operation and orderly shutdown of the plant. The Board also called on the Center for Chemical Process Safety, a division of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, to revise control room siting guidelines to address the characteristics of all Class 1B flammable liquids. msa altair pro Nitrogen blanketing is one way of reducing the classification of an area. Another cheaper and far more simpler way for reducing the degree of classification, is the ventilation. For example if an area of a production building of a plant, does have some vessels having some hazardous liquids, but if the area is very well ventilated by having something like huge exhaust fans and blowers in it ( implying that the fumes that are explosive, will be easily dispersed outside), then the area classification can be reduced (say from a Division 1 to Division 2 OR from a Division 2 to a Safe Area). However, there is a catch. The conditions, under which this area classification was done, MUST NOT CHANGE and these conditions must be communicated to the personnel who operate the plant."

 In any process plant that processes hazardous materials ( those that are potentially explosive or inflammable), there are some places, where these materials are very likely to be present and in other places, least likely to be present. Even in places where these materials are present in large quantities, it does not mean, that they can burst into flames anytime (for example, one may have thousands of gallons of Acetone, a highly inflammable liquid in a storage tank, but it may have a Nitrogen blanketing over it, so no chances of it ever catching fire). Thus, if one does a study of the various areas in such plant, that could be hazardous, one will find some areas with more likelihood of fire/explosion, some with lesser likelihood of the fire/explosion and other areas with a very very little chance of ever bursting into flames. Based on this, we can classify such areas as Division 1, Division 2 and Safe areas. If we use the IEC system then we have the classification as Zone 0, Zone 1, Zone 2 and safe. It is now almost three years since the Buncefield oil storage depot explosion took place and finally the authorities have declared, that they will be pressing criminal charges against five companies, ostensibly who have been found guilty of acts of omission. Safety engineering The participants were from end user companies in India such as Essar, Tata Power, Reliance, National Peroxide and others; from well known automation and component suppliers such as Siemens, P F, Endress Hauser, Chemtrols, Forbes Marshall, Pyroban and others ; leading engineering consultants such as Shaw Rolta, SNC Lavalin and others; Indian construction  contracting companies such as HCC and others; as well as independent engineering consultants. All participants were unanimous in their feedback about the workshop in a single word. Excellent! carbon monoxide detectorWorkplace safety On the other hand, all of us agree that a lack of understanding of how to carry out area classification, can result in a disaster at worst, or at best, a huge lifecycle cost. How? If a poor area classification scheme results in a hazardous area marked as non-hazardous, then that is an invitation to a disaster. Similarly, overzealous area classification can result in large swathes of your plant marked as hazardous, when in reality they need not be. If a typical life of a process plant is about 30 years then you have 30 years of increased maintenance and operations costs, that will fly under the radar of most managers. So it will bleed your plant dry without anybody noticing it. Great, isn't it? fall prevention What is surprising in this case is that all of them were reportedly wearing Hydrogen Sulfide gas monitors, that are supposed to measure the H2S concentration in the ambient air and sound an alarm if dangerous levels are detected. It is not clear if the instruments did not work, or whether the workers simply ignored them. 

 The level control loop, (that is supposed to control the level in the tank and prevent overfilling) on one of the storage tanks failed. It consisted of a Servo tank gauge connected to a series of valves. This failure led to overfilling and spillage of massive amounts of petroleum into the dikes surrounding the storage tank. Petroleum was being pumped in at a rate of about 550 m3/hr for more than three hours, yet the servo level gauge indication, failed to record any change at all! It is now almost three years since the Buncefield oil storage depot explosion took place and finally the authorities have declared, that they will be pressing criminal charges against five companies, ostensibly who have been found guilty of acts of omission. Occupational Safety and Health Administration It appears that DuPont may be fined $750,000 by the The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, says a report published by WDEL. The fine is for more than 60 violations of safety and environmental standards at a facility near the Delaware Memorial Bridge. protective clothingSafety culture It appears that DuPont may be fined $750,000 by the The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, says a report published by WDEL. The fine is for more than 60 violations of safety and environmental standards at a facility near the Delaware Memorial Bridge. gas detection As far as disasters are concerned, the BP incident is a rare event these days-more of a black swan event-not that I am saying that it could not have been predicted or that the response could not have been better, but that it was really perhaps the first incident in which a blowout preventer failed. Or was it really the first one, as BP claims? Have there been other incidents in the past when these devices failed? Perhaps someone in the Oil and Gas industry should come out with statistics. 

 Is it possible that if we use gas detectors to continuosly monitor the explosive limits in a classified (hazardous) location, we could manage it better? Shell now says that about 50% of the oil has already been dissipated or evaporated, though a rainbow like sheen can still be seen on the ocean's surface. Safety The overfill protection was provided by a point level switch which was supposed to be independently connected to an alarm/annunciator panel (separate circuit from the DCS loop). The panel had an override switch and it may be that the interlock was bypassed (no conclusive evidence since everything got burned in the subsequent fire, this may never be known). However it is warning to design engineers who think that by merely having a redundant level switch is good enough. Were there any common cause failures that both the continuous indication, as well as the interlock failed? Not known for sure. 3m safety glassesHerbert William Heinrich Mrs. Jones says, As a wife, I just assumed that he had a normal, everyday 7:00 to 3:30, Monday through Friday job, safe as my job. I would have never dreamed in a million years he would have been killed in an explosion. confined space equipment For noncompliance with the terms of the settlement agreement, the BP Texas City Refinery has been issued 270 notifications of failure to abate with fines totaling $56.7 million. Each notification represents a penalty of $7,000 times 30 days, the period that the conditions have remained unabated. OSHA also identified 439 new willful violations for failures to follow industry-accepted controls on the pressure relief safety systems and other process safety management violations with penalties totaling $30.7 million. 1327023336